Indian Religious Freedom and Governmental Development of Public Lands
In the early 1970's, the federal government abandoned its official policy of terminating tribes as a means of forcing American Indians1 to assimi late into mainstream society.2 Yet the elimination of the basis of Indian religious belief by government action continues apace. The recent resur gence of site-specific Indian religions,3 coinciding with stepped-up federal development of public lands,4 highlights the dilemma of native worshipers in a system that does not recognize site-specific belief. Indian tribes are challenging development plans affecting sacred areas in previously undis turbed federal and state lands, claiming that the free exercise clause pro tects their religious interest in governmental property.� 1. The terms Indian, Native American, and native are used interchangeably throughout this Note.
2.
In a letter to Congress dated July 8, 1970 , President Nixon declared that the federal policy of formal termination of Indian tribes as a method of encouraging assimilation, H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., in force since 1953, was "morally and legally unacceptable, because it produces bad practical results, and because the mere threat of termination tends to discourage greater self sufficiency among Indian groups .. .. " Instead of a policy of termination, President Nixon recom mended that the federal government encourage self-determination among Indian tribes. 1 16 CoNG. REc. 23,132 (1970) . Congress responded by enacting several pieces of legislation designed to promote self-determination. See, e.g., Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, 25 U.S.C. § § 450a-450n (1982) ; Act of December 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-550, 84 Stat. 1437 (1970) (returning sacred Blue Lake area to Taos Pueblos). See generally D. GETCHES, D. RosENFELT & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 86-112 (1979 & Supp. 1983 (tracing deleterious effects of ter mination, and change of federal policy since 1970); Israel, The Reemergence of Tribal Nationalism and Its Impact on Reseroation Resource Development, 47 U. Cow. L. REV. 617 (1 976) (tribal nationalism and congressional encouragement of self-determination together with protection of Indian rights by Supreme Court have brought about great change and progress since mid-1960's) .
3. Professor Brown points out that Native American religions have survived colonization and cultural isolation, and are nourishing today:
American Indian religions represent preeminent examples of primal religious traditions that have been present in the Americas for some thirty to sixty thousand years. Fundamental ele ments common to the primal nature of those traditions not only survive into the present among Indian cultures of the Americas, but in many cases are currently being reexamined and reaf firmed by the people with increasing and remarkable vigor. j. BROWN, THE SPIRITUAL LEGACY OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN 1 (1982) .
4. See Jawetz, The Public Trust Totem in Public Land Law: Ineffective-And Undesir able-judicial Interoention, 10 EcoLOGY L.Q. 455, 459-60 (1982) (commercial exploitation of wealth of natural resources on public lands steadily increased over last 30 years); Mantell, Preserva tion and Use: Concessions in the National Parks, 8 EcoLOGY L.Q. 1, 2 n. 3 (1979) ("intense use of the parks which accelerated greatly after World War II continues to increase each year," based on Park Service statistics of recreational use from .
5. Indian suits seeking to block development because of their religious beliefs or practices include: Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 371 (1983) , cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 739 (1984) , cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 739 (1984) (Hopi suit against proposed expansion of ski resort in Coconino Mountains); New Mexico Navajo Ranchers Ass'n v. ICC, 702 F.2d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1 983) (Navajo suit against ICC's grant of authority to construct rail line); Badoni v. Higginson, The requested relief is fundamentally different from traditional rel igious exemptions; and current free exercise analysis is constrained by concepts drawn from Judea-Christian doctrine. The Note concludes that courts must adopt a less rigid approach that takes into consideration the unique site-specificity of Indian religions, in order to provide adequate constitu tional protection for sacred sites.
l. I NDIAN T HEOLOGY AND THE R ELIGIOUS N ATURE OF THE C LAIMS
Judicial analysis of the religious interests at stake in Native American challenges to site development has in large part misconstrued the nature of Indian beliefs and practices, and has thereby denied constitutional protec tion to legitimate Indian religious claims.9 The J udeo-Christian concept of a supreme and immortal deity, belief in whom may be divorced in many respects from any specific situs or mode of worship, is not applicable to 638 F.2d 172 (1Oth Cir. 1980), (Navajo suit against water storage project and management of Rain bow Bridge National Monument), cert. denied, 452 U.S. 954 (1981); Sequoyah v. TV A, 620 F.2d 1159 (6th Cir.) (Cherokee challenge to Tellico Dam), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 953 (1980) ; Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. 586 (N.D. Cal. 1983 ) (Yurok, Karok and Tolowa challenge to proposed road construction and timber harvesting plans on federal land in Cali fornia), appeal pending, No. 83-2225 (9th Cir. argued July 9, 1984 ; Crow v. Gullet, 54! F. Supp. 785 (D.S.D. 1982 ) (Lakota and Tsistsista challenge to state management of Bear Butte Park), affd, 706 F.2d 856 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 413 (1983) . 6. Sites sacred to native religions but not in actual possession of the Indian worshipers are often located on public lands. As the legislative history of tne American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 42 U.S. C. § 1996 (1982) , states: "There are certain sites, a hill, a lake, or a forest glade which are sacred to Indian religions .... Most of these sites not in Indian possession are owned by the Federal Government and a few are on State lands." 123 CONG. REC. 39,300 (1977) (statement of Sen. Abourezle).
7. A religion may be destroyed when the cosmology upon which it is founded is undermined. See ]. CAMPBELL, THE MASKS oF Goo: CREATIVE MYTHOLOGY 5-6 (1968) :
For those in whom a local mythology still works, there is an experience both of accord with the social order, and of harmony with the universe .. .. [Where the mythology is no longer meaningful, however,] the individual can only harden to some figure of living death; and if any considerable number of these members of a civilization are in this predicament, a point of no return [for the religion] will have been passed. 8. See Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 740 n.2 (testimony of tribal leader that development would destroy basis of Hopi belief); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d at 177 (" [T] he stated infringement is the drowning of the Navajo gods."); Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Ass'n v. Peterson, 565 F. Supp. at 592 (logging would impair collection of medicinal plants and erode religious significance of sacred area).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 56-83.
many Indian religions. Native American religions view gods, people, and nature as an integral whole. In this view of the universe, spiritual and physical reality converge in certain natural phenomena or locations. 10 In many Indian religions, therefore, transcendent reality is not immune to destructive physical forces.11 Indeed, an Indian deity may be particularly vulnerable to changes in the physical habitat to which it is intimately and inseparably connected. 12 In short, location is essential to many aspects of Indian ritual and belief. In Indian belief, the place where an event oc curred, rather than the event itself, assumes special spiritual significance.
As a result, Indian worship focuses not so much on revelatory events, but on spiritual renewal through ceremonious and individual relationships with holy places.13 Thus actual spiritual residence in, or the necessity of communicating with the spirits through, certain locations makes the de struction of an Indian sacred site a cataclysmic event. Even the prospect of [T]he simple hunting religion of the Naskaipi Indians of Labrador contrasts sharply with the intricate horticultural religion of the Pueblo Indians of New Mexico and Arizona, and the simple structure of the Californian Indian religions bears little resemblance to the religion of sacred kingship represented by the Natchez on the lower Mississippi. Even among tribal reli gions of the same type the nature of conceptions and rites has varied. The more our research is concerned with taking stock of tribal Indian religions the richer and more complicated becomes our picture of their total outcome. Yet it is universally true among Indian religions that transcendent reality and the natural world are not divided by any bright conceptual line. As noted by Professor Hultkrantz, "divinity manifests its being through nature." A. HULTKRANTZ 11. In Indian belief and ritual, the relationship between spritual reality and physical reality is symbiotic, both aspects finding expression in an appropriate vision of the way things are. As one scholar has explained the Indian perception of reality:
[I]t's rather like looking through the viewfinder of a camera, the viewfinder which is based upon the principle of the split image. And it is a matter of trying to align the two planes of that particular view. This can be used as an example of how we look at the world around us. Y./e see it with the physical eye. We see it as it appears to us, in one dimension of reality. But we also see it with the eye of the mind. It seems to me that the Indian has achieved a particu larly effective alignment of those two planes of vision. He perceives the landscape in both ways. He realizes a whole image from the possibilities within his reach. The moral implica tions of this are very far-reaching. Here is where we get into the consideration of religion and religious ideas and ideals. Momaday, Native American Attitudes to the Environment, in SEEING WITH A NATIVE EYE: EssAYS ON NATIVE AMERICAN RELIGION 79, 81 (W. Capps ed. 1976) . This alignment of spiritual and physical reality in nature makes the spiritual uniquely tied to the physical, and partially explains why native belief is site-specific, thus making development of a sacred site a threat to religious life as well as religious practice.
12. See Testimony of Assiniboine Chief John Snow, quoted in A. HULTKRANTZ, BELIEF AND WoRSHIP, supra note 10, at 127: "If [a sacred] area is destroyed, marred, or polluted, my people say, the spirits will leave the area. If pollution continues not only animals, birds, and plant life will disap pear, but the spirits will also leave. This is one of the greatest concerns of Indian people."
13. V. DELORIA, Goo IS RED 80-81 (1973) ; see also FEDERAL AGENCIES TASK FoRCE, AMERI CAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT REPORT 10 (1979) ("The tribal religions do not incorporate a set of established truths but serve to perpetuate a set of rituals and ceremonies which must . . be performed at the place and in the manner . . . designated.").
The Yale Law journal Vol. 94: 1447 Vol. 94: , 1985 the desecration of the Christian sites in Jerusalem by an enemy of Chris tianity, which was enough to send countless Christians on religious cru sades/4 did not threaten actual spiritual destruction.15
Yet religions that posit a separation between spiritual and physical reality may infuse certain locations with such religious meaning and history that their preservation is of great importance to adherents. For Judaism and Christianity, those sites are located in the Middle East, and, to most Americans, seem distant and somehow magical or more genuinely "religious" than an Indian location in a national park or forest.
In Israel, such places and access to them are protected 16 by the 14. From the late eleventh century through the thirteenth century, European Peregrini Christi flocked to the Middle East to free the Holy Land, and especially Jerusalem, from Saracen control. R. PAYNE, THE DREAM AND THE TOMB: A HISTORY OF THE CRUSADES 17 (1984) (" [P] easants all owed themselves to be uprooted, [and princes] plundered their treasuries in order to make the pilgrim age; [survivors were few , yet they] returned proud and happy that they had been to the holy places."). The role of the earthly city of Jerusalem as the spiritual center of Christian worship for the Crusaders made freeing the holy city a religious mission of the highest importance. Pilgrims "believed that they were marching directly to the city of eternal bliss." H. MAYER, THE CRUSADES 12 U Gillingham trans. 1972). Indeed, Christians had believed in the sanctity of places associated with the life of Jesus and early Christians long before the Crusades brought the notion of a sacred place to the center of international politics. As one scholar noted, "The places associated with the life of Christ, or with the lives of the apostles, saints, and martyrs, were reputed to be of special sanctity." P. NEWHALL, THE CRUSADES 22 (1927) .
Representative Udall noted the parallel between Indian sites and sacred sites in the Middle East for Christians and Jews:
For many tribes, the land is filled with physical sites of religious and sacred significance to them. Can we not understand that� Our religions have their Jerusalems, Mt. Calvarys, Vati cans and Meccas. We hold sacred Bethlehem, Nazareth, the Mount of Olives, and the Wailing Wall. Bloody wars have been fought because of these religious sites. 124 CoN G. REc. 21,444 (1978) .
15. In fact, Judea-Christian religions may be hestitant to attach special spiritual importance to physical structures or sites. In the United States, most houses of worship do not acquire religious significance in the eyes of communicants, since the spiritual is usually considered distinct from partic ular locations or structures. The required historic preservation of a physical structure for historic, cultural or aesthetic reasons not directly tied to religious significance may therefore impose great hardship on the religious institution involved. Courts that have considered the issue of a religious institution's free exercise right to be exempt from burdensome property use regulations and restric tions have rejected the argument that the First Amendment provides relief from historic preservation ordinances. See, e.g., Society for Ethical Culture v. Spatt, 51 N.Y.2d 449, 415 N.E.2d 922, 434 N.Y.S.2d 932 (1980) (free exercise clause does not protect religious organization from neutral historic preservation regulations). Yet a religious belief that does not attach spiritual importance to the partic ular site of houses of worship may conceivably be so burdened by high maintenance costs as to impede substantially the fulfillment of religious obligations. Cf Note, Land Use Regulation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 CoLUM. L. REV. 1562 REV. (1984 61 (1978) . The Aboriginal Commission would institute such proposed reforms as the "legal recognition ... of the right to visit and preserve sacred shrines and burial grounds, whether or not they are found on lands to which aboriginal title has been granted." ld. at 62.
19. See infra text accompanying notes 48-55. 20 . Belief in the sanctity of a particular place, and in actual spiritual residence in the place, is not confined to primitive or aboriginal peoples; nor is the destruction or desecration of the habitat of a perplexing question of the legal rights of native minorities.23
The legal relationship between conqueror and conquered in colonial so cieties has often been compared to a trust or fiduciary relationship run ning from government to native populations.24 The development of legally deity confined to modern colonial powers. The sanctuary of Apollo at Delphi was for many centuries a focal point of Greek worship and Greece's premier oracle. From all over the Mediterranean world, pilgrims came to Delphi to receive from the oracle the god's commandments for the conduct of their lives, and to bring rich offerings in gratitude and piety. P. HOYLE, DELPHI 66 ( 1967) . After the Roman conquest of Greece, Delphi was despoiled by the conquerors. !d. at 120. Like the destruction or desecration of sacred sites in Native American religions, the depredatior1 of Delphi undermined the religious power of the site. When Roman emperor Julian, called the Apostate, attempted to revive the ancient religion in the fourth century C.E., the oracle is said to have replied to his appeal:
Tell the King, the fairwrought hall has fallen to the ground, no longer has Phoebus a h:.tt, nor a prophetic laurel, nor a spring that speaks. The water of speech even is quenched. [T] he manner in which ethnically distinct, aboriginal communities come to terms with the rapid encroachments of a politically and technologically advanced civilisation must rank, on any level, as a problem of the first importance.").
24. This trusteeship theory was first advanced in the sixteenth century by the Spanish theologian and publicist Francisco de Vitoria, who argued that colonial authorities, possessing a "more mature intelligence" than their aboriginal subjects, should be required to act "for the welfare and in the interests of the Indians and not merely for the Spaniards." Viloria De lndis et de lure Belli Rejlec tiones, quoted in G. BENNETT, supra note 18, at 7; see also Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States, 31 GEO. L.J 1 (1942) (analyzing positive contribution of Vitoria to protection of Indian rights in Americas); Williams, The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. CAL L. REv. 1, 63-99 (1983) (Vitoria's dualistic approach to Indians as having natural rights but as subject to colonial rule as a result of violation of international law of nations has had strong and harmful influence on subsequent enforceable trust duties has been problematic in the United States,25 how ever, and all but nonexistent in other countries.26 It is hardly surprising that this doctrine, which imposes only "moral" duties on the government as guardian, has remained advantageous to the guardians rather than to their wards.27 With regard to the preservation of sacred sites, the solution for American Indians lies in the free exercise clause of the United States Constitution, which protects the exercise of religious beliefs against all but the most compelling state interests. Yet to date courts have not accorded Indian free exercise claims proper scrutiny.
II.
T
HE C URRENT S TATUS OF S ITE-S PE CIFI C F REE E XER CISE C LAIMS BY N ATIVE A MERI CANS

Indian suits challenging development of public lands in the United
States28 are based on the First Amendment guarantee of the free exercise civil and common law colonial authorities).
The trusteeship analogy was adopted by Great Britain and other colonial powers, and was the cornerstone of Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) I, 7 (1831) ("[Indian tribes] are in a state of pupillage. Their relation to the federal government resembles that of a ward to his guardian.").
25. Since the relationship between Indian tribes and national government is often said only to "resemble" that of ward and guardian, it has been held not to require any legal!y enforceable duties except where such duties have been explicitly assumed by government. See, e.g. , United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell [), 445 U.S. 535, 542 (1980) [1882] 7 App. Cas. 619 (P. C.) (trust between British government and native populations of India is moral obligation, a "trust in the higher sense," and only trusts in the lower sense are enforceable through legal action).
27. Note, The American Indian Religious Freedom Act, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 429, 439 (1983) (anal ogy of relationship between federal government and Indians to trust relationship is fundamentally flawed because government may "unilaterally abrogate trust agreements" and may as sovereign refuse to be sued). But see United States v. Mitchell, 103 S. Ct. 2961 (1983) (Mitchell//) (regulation giving government responsibility for managing harvest of timber on Indian land created enforceable fiduciary relationship that may subject government to money damages). Mitchell II may signal a shift in the trust doctrine toward enforceability, although the decision is limited to cases in which the United States has assumed a statutory duty and has further consented to suit for enforcement of the statute. Cf Note, Money Damages fo r Breach of the Federal-Indian Trust Relationship Aft er Mitchell II, 59 WASH. L. REV. 675 (1983) .
28. See supra cases cited note 5. A.
Indian Free Exercise Challenges to Development
Faced with Indian challenges to development projects, some courts have denied that development of public lands gives rise to any free exercise claim, emphasizing that the plaintiffs have no "property" interest at stake.32 Other courts, however, have recognized that lack of a specific 29. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . ." U.S. CaNST. amend. 1.
30. 42 U.S. C. § 1996 (1982) . In addition, plaintiffs have unsuccessfully argued that courts should enforce the fiduciary duties owed by the government to the Indians. The doctrine that explains the relationship between the federal government and Indians as one that resembles a trust duty running from government to the Indians, obligating government to act in the Indians' best interest, was first Dec. 16, 1966 , in force Mar. 23, 1976 , reprinted in I. BROWNLIE, supra, at 270, to no avail.
31. See supra note 5. Indians have also increasingly sought to assert their rights in court to lands under treaties, see, e.g. , County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation, 105 S. Ct. 1245 Ct. (1985 The "property interest" basis for denying free exercise claims raises the question, of course, of where the government "got" the property in the first place. As Representa tive Udall noted, "it is stating the obvious to say that this country was the Indians [sic] long before it was ours." 124 CoN G. REC. 21,444 ( 1978) . If the taking was unjust to begin with, it seems especially egregious to use the lack of a legal interest in land to deny a free exercise claim for protection of preexisting sacred sites. See Bennett, Aboriginal Title in the Common Law: A Stony Path Through Feudal Doctrine, 27 BUFFALO L. REV. 617, 623 (1978) ("[ C]ourts ought not to go behind the native system in search of common law notions of property which communal native possession neither knows nor requires. " ).
33. See, e.g., Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735, 744 n.5 (D. C. Cir. 1983) (government property rights not exempt from free exercise limitations, although plaintiffs failed to meet initial burden of demonstrating infringement); Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d 172, 176 (1Oth Cir. 1980 ) (lack of prop erty interest not conclusive, but a factor to consider when weighing governmental interest against free exercise claim).
The relationship of First Amendment rights to government property is complex. Certainly the fact that a legal property interest does not exist is not the relevant gauge for determining whether or not a First Amendment claim is valid. See infr a text accompanying notes 87-9 1 (public forum doctrine protects First Amendment rights on government lands).
34. For example, in Wilson , 708 F.2d 735 (D. C. Cir. 1983 ) the court of appeals denied a Hopi claim that development of a ski resort on mountains sacred to the tribe would constitute an infringe ment of protected religious freedoms, despite such testimony as that of the Chairman of the Hopi Tribe, Abbott Sekaquaptewa, who testified at trial that:
If [development] is permitted, we will not be able successfully to teach our people that this is a sacred place .... Our people will not accept the view that this is the sacred Home of the Kachinas. The basis of our existence as a society will become a mere fairy tale to our people. 708 F.2d at 740 n.2. The court found that destruction of "a religion's most sacred shrine " did not state a prima facie free exercise claim. !d. at 741. The court distinguished Pillar of Fire v. Denver Urban Renewal Auth., 181 Colo. 41 1, 509 P.2d 1250, 1254 (1973) (religious faith and tradition may provide First Amendment protection for certain structures that have "unique religious significance " against demolition in city urban renewal project), on the ground that "a governmental taking of pri vately owned religious property ... involves different considerations than does a claimed First Amendment right to restrict government's use of its own land. " 708 F.2d at 742 n. 3. 35. 638 F.2d 172 (lOth Cir. 1980) . 36. In the court's words, "the stated infringement is the drowning of Navajo gods, the increased tourist presence [and accompanying noise, litter, and defacement of the bridge itself] attributable to the level at which the lake is kept, and the denial of access to the prayer spot now under water." !d. at 177. Talking Rock, one of the drowned gods, inhabited a collection of rocks at the mouth of a creek on the floor of Glen Canyon. K. LuCKERT, NAVAJO MOUNTAIN AND RAINBOW BRIDGE RELIGION compelling governmental interest in water storage, refused to reach the question whether the government's action in fringed native rel igion.37
The Badoni court further held that granting the requested free exercise relief wo uld necessarily violate the establishment clause, by creating a "government-managed religious shrine."38 The opinion implies that be cause protection constitutes a limitation on the alienability of public lands in the interest of religious freedom, it inevitably implicates impermissible establishment of religion.39
Only one court has determined both that proposed development posed a substantial threat to site-specific Native American religions, and that the governmental infringement could not be justified in light of the free exer 37. Because of a predetermined overriding governmental interest in the maintenance of the water level of Lake Powell, the court held that it need not reach the question whether the government's action burdened the Navajo religion. 638 F.2d at 177 n.4. 39. 638 F.2d at 178-79. The court also denied more limited relief, such as requiring tourists to behave respectfully when visiting Rainbow Bridge, or allowing the Indian worshipers exclusive access on infrequent occasions for the conduct of religious ceremonies. First Amendment use of public lands, the court held, does not give plaintiffs a constitutional right to have their beliefs respected: "We must accommodate our idiosyncracies, religious as well as secular, to the compromises necessary in commu nal life." (quoting Otten v. Baltimore & O.R. Co., 205 F.2d 58, 61 (2d Cir. 1953) 
III.
CuRRENT FREE ExERCISE METHODOLOGY AND
AMERICAN CuLTURAL BrAs
The substance of American free exercise rights has been impermissibly circumscribed to familiar or mainstream beliefs both because of flaws in free exercise methodology, and because of the fundamental ideologies that inform the national perception of religion and of the role of development as a sign of progress. These two factors have combined to produce a body of free exercise doctrine that does not recognize non-traditional Indian claims to protect sacred sites.
A.
Free Exercise Methodolo gy
Traditional free exercise doctrine has developed through claims of indi viduals or groups for religious exemptions from governmental activity or regulation. Those suits, which include efforts to obtain exemption from the military draft116 or compulsory education117 laws, differ fundamentally from Indian actions that seek to bar development of government-owned lands. In the former, the government's actions themselves are not chal lenged. Rather the action as applied to particular religious individuals is the heart of the dispute.118 Indian suits to block development, on the other hand, challenge a generally valid governmental activity as it affects certain religious sites, rather than certain religious individuals or segments of the population . Not only are the faiths that underlie Indian suits radically different than Western monotheistic religions, but, not unexpectedly, the requested relief is different, too.
56.
See, e. g. , Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 344 (1970) (all draftees who hold deep, conscientious objection to all wars founded on moral, ethical or religious belief entitled to exemption from military service); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 176 (1965) (draftee who holds "sincere and meaningful belief which occupies in the life of its possessor a place parallel to that filled by the God of those admittedly qualifying for exemption" entitled to exemption from military service).
57. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (free exercise clause mandates exemption from compulsory education laws for children of Old Order Amish beyond eighth grade).
58. For example, in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) , the validity of government provi sions regulating unemployment benefits was not challenged. South Carolina's Unemployment Com pensation Act was held unconstitutional only as applied to a Seventh Day Adventist whose refusal to work on Saturday stemmed from "a basic tenet of the Seventh-day Adventist creed, based upon that religion's interpretation of the Holy Bible." /d. at 399 n. 1.
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These essential differences between standard free exercise exemption claims and Indian claims are central to many courts' reasoning when de nying Indian claims.�9 The structural distinctions between traditional free exercise claims and Indian suits should serve not so much to invalidate Indian claims, however, as to highlight the doctrinal flaws in current free exercise doctrine.
Free exercise analysis classically focuses on traditional indicia of J udeo
Christian religions, such as a scriptural foundation for religious convic tions, emphasizing the religious quality of "acts of conscience."30 An anal ysis that centers on individual conscience to ascertain the existence of in terference with religious liberty is at once underinclusive and overinclusive. 61 Conscience, while it does motivate much religious behav ior, is not the purview solely of the religious. 62 Faith in an alternative reality that symbolically embodies the explanation for the way the world is or the way the world should be, is a universal element of religion. 63 59. In Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d at 741, the court stated that Supreme Court free exercise cases "hold only that the government may not, by conditioning benefits, penalize adherence to religious belief. Many government actions may offend religious believers, and may cast doubt upon the veracity of religious beliefs, but unless such actions penalize faith, they do not burden religion." Destruction of a tribal belief structure, the court held, does not violate the free exercise clause unless a governmental benefit is denied or conditioned in such a way that it discriminates against religion. Such an analysis, however, is inapplicable to Indian belief, since no benefit in the commonly understood sense of the term flows from government's leaving sacred sites on public lands undisturbed. Other cases have also emphasized that the different nature of Indian free exercise claims does not fit neatly into traditional analysis, and have held that this departure from the standard claim for exemption precludes granting the requested relief. See Badoni v. Higginson, 638 F.2d at 178 ("Free exercise claims generally chal lenge government dictates which compel citizens to violate tenets of their religion . . . or government action which conditions a benefit or right on renunciation of a religious practice.") (citations omitted); Crow v. Gullet, 541 F. Supp. at 791 ("free exercise clause places a duty upon a state to keep from prohibiting religious acts, not to provide the means or environment for carrying them out").
60. See, e.g. , Thomas v. Review Bd. , 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (employee who quit when transferred to munitions factory by employer entitled to unemployment benefits since work in arms manufacture would violate his conscience); Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361 (1974) (denial of veteran's benefits did not force conscientious objector who had performed alternative service to make untenable choice between violating conscience or serving in armed forces).
61. Because free exercise doctrine emphasizes acts of conscience, it leaves acts of faith and objects of faith unprotected. On the other hand, while conscience does overlap to a large degree with religion, the protection could technically extend beyond the bounds of religious behavior, since it is certainly true that not all conscientious behavior is religiously motivated. This explains the difficulty the Su preme Court has experienced when faced with conscientious objection to war that is certainly sincere and the product of individual examination of conscience, but not the result of religious belief. Com pare, for example, United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. at 173-74 (conscientious objection to war must be religious as opposed to political, sociological or economic beliefs, or mere personal code of ethics) with Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. at 344 (conscientious objection may be based on "deeply held moral, clinical or religious beliefs").
62. See, e.g. , M. 63. Clifford Geertz has proposed an anthropological definition of religion as:
(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) religious fa ith rather than merely individual conscience. 64
In addi tion to stressing acts of conscience, courts have held that to trig ger free exercise protection a belief must be shown to be "central" or 64. Professor Perry Dane has argued that the focus on conscience improperly emphasizes "preventing injuries to conscience rather than enforcing claims of right .
." Note, supra note 62, at 357. Indeed, a generalized "right of conscience" would imply that individuals should have substan tially fewer obligations to obey laws, even when such laws are propounded within the current bounds of governmental authority. !d. at 357 n.48, 362-63. See generally Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 ("ordered liberty " requires that individuals not be allowed to formulate personal standards of conduct in areas of concern to society as a whole). The protection of religious exercise, therefore, is not so much a license to be free from all violations of individual conscience as a prohibition against government intrusion into the province of faith.
65. See, e.g. , Sequoyah v. TVA, 620 F.2d 1159 , 1164 (6th Cir. 1980 71. This tendency to protect the familiar may explain the contrary results in People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) , where the California Supreme Court held that the California legislature could not constitutionally prohibit members of the Native American Church from using peyote as a sacramental symbol similar to that cf the bread and wine used in the Christian Eucharist, and cases such as Wilson v. Block, 708 F.2d 735 (D.C. Cir. 1983) , in which the court of appeals held that development of a sacred site that did not entail denial of access could not pose a free exercise problem. Although the peyote cases go both ways, compare, e.g. , Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1964) with State v. Soto, 21 Or. App. 794, 537 P.2d 142 (1975) REv. 1, 8-9 (1982) (historically, federal government relied on missionaries to "civilize" Indians, on theory that Indian religion is "primitive" and thus contrary to national, religious, and social ideals). The vision of America as somehow special in the eyes of a metaphysical Christian God does not leave room for a system of belief based on aboriginal notions of religious truth as embodied in the physical world. Jones eds. 1974) (articulating theory of civil religion as powerful force of national unification and identity). This collection of beliefs, symbols and rituals with respect to sacred things institutionalized in a collectivity shares much in common with Judea-Christian principles, and forms the "vehicle of a national religious self-understanding." /d. at 29. This ideological structure operates on the legal plane as well as in the political sphere. See Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 9 (1983) (legal tradition is narrative embodiment of normative societal ideals and includes not only a corpus juris, but also a mythological complex and language for interpretation of behavior according to systematic norms).
75. The belief entails a conception of America as the Chosen Land, the Israel of old, with a God actively interested in American history and success, both material and spiritual. See Bellah, supra note 74, at 29. 
This mythlc aspect of government reinforces the chasm between Native
American religions and their protection by the court system.78
The emphasis of Indian belief on the confluence of spirit and nature is fundamentally at odds with a basic premise of American civil religion.
The pioneer and development ideals of the westward movement in the nineteenth century glorified taming the wilds in the interests of progress and prosperity. These ideals still inform the national civil religion79 and stand in opposition to Indian concepts of cyclical rather than linear his tory.80 The Native American emphasis on the confluence and interaction of space and time places a value on physical reality unknown in the main stream of modern American public or private belief.81
To the extent, therefore, that the judiciary is influenced by American civil religion and traditional monotheistic understandings of spiritual sep aration from the physical world, claims by Indians that development of public lands violates their religious beliefs would seem at once obstruc tionist and counterproductive. 82 In this land of great freedom and republi can virtues, this ideology argues, we must not allow regressive atti tudes-even religious ones-to get in the way of the greater good. Some exceptions are allowable, because they are relatively cost-free, but Indian free exercise claims would require government to alter its understanding of its property rights in public lands. Only in America, where they have such freedom and wealth, the courts seem to be implying, would native groups raise such "outlandish" claims.83 To consider the problem care-78. See Indians and Religious Freedom, unpublished anonymous paper, delivered at the National Indian Youth Council, Albuquerque, N.M., April 7, 1984, at 7 (on file with author) (civil religion of United States largely developed to justify suppression and extermination of Indians and of their way of life).
79. The ideal of progress as embodied in the westward movement, and the legends surrounding the pioneer settlement and development of the West, are still potent forces in the national American psyche. For European settlers, the notion of wilderness was one filled with both terror and challenge. The prospect of profit from exploration and settlement drew pioneers ever further westward, but as one scholar has noted, pioneers viewed the land as "satanic rather than sacred." F. TURNER, BEYOND GEOGRAPHY: THE WESTERN SPIRIT AGAINST THE WILDERNESS 279 (1983); see also P. MATTHIES SEN, supra note 30, at 7 ("To judge from the ruthless treatment of 'the wilderness' and the wasteful and destructive exploitation of the continent, the view of primordial nature as a wilderness to be tamed and dominated has persisted in North America to this day.").
80. See V. DELORIA, supra note 13, at 75-109 (1973) (European or "Newtonian" concept of linear history is foreign to Indians, whose understanding of space and time is cyclical, and more closely resembles that postulated recently by physicists, recognizing that apparently objective truths such as space and time are relative, and that an experimenter actually affects outcome of seemingly objective experiments).
81. See fEDERAL AGENCIES' TASK FORCE, AMERICAN INDIAN RELIGIOUS FREEDOM ACT RE PORT 12 ( 1979) (unique among American religions, free exercise for Indians "is the right to adjust to and maintain relationships with the natural world").
82. See supra note 73.
83. An examination of the religious interests at stake in Indian claims, together with an under standing of the role of sacred sites in aboriginal populations worldwide, illustrates that the Indian claims are not out of the ordinary, however. For example, Christians (Ould begin to comprehend the devastation to religion caused by the destruction of a sacred site if they imagine a proposal to construct fully, however, is to realize that protection of sacred Indian sites 1s essen tial to Native American constitutional rights.
IV. TOWARD FREE EXERCISE PROTECTION OF SACRED SITES
The free exercise clause and establishment clause together stand for the proposition that religious variety unhampered by government interference is of great value to our society .84 Governmental orthodoxy in either a posi tive85 or a negative86 sense is prohibited. When an Indian religion or deity may be destroyed as a result of governmental action and thus be the victim of a negative orthodoxy , the free exercise clause should protect the reli gious interest at stake. Courts holding that the requested relief falls outside the ambit of the constitutional protection of religious freedom have not adequately examined analogous areas of the law to determine whether to impose a limitation on property rights in public lands to protect the constitutional rights of Native Americans. This Note proposes two analoa ski resort on the Mount of Olives. Most Christians would find such a development abhorrent and insulting to the momentous events the area has witnessed, if not actually destructive of spiritual reality.
After the Six-Day War, for example, the United States Representative to the United Nations de clared that "the safeguarding of the Holy Places, and freedom of access to them for all, should be internationally guaranteed." U.N. Doc. A/P.V. 1546, at 3-5 (1967) 1355, 1371 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("[O] ur remarkable and precious religious diversity as a na tion" is protected by establishment clause.).
85. The establishment clause prohibits government from directly mandating what is the correct belief, and from indirectly establishing an orthodoxy by supporting one religion at the expense of another. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982) ("The clearest command of the Establish ment Clause is that one religious denomination cannot be officially preferred over another."); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952) ("The government must be neutral when it comes to competi tion between sects."); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-11 ( 1947) (indignation of colonists at compulsory worship and/or taxation in support of ministers motivated establishment clause). Justice Jackson in West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) wrote the classic defense of the constitutional freedom to dissent from the views of mainstream society: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion .... If there are any circum stances which permit an exception, they do not now occur to us."
86. Just as government may not dictate what orthodoxy is, neither may it establish what ortho doxy is not, by refusing to protect unusual or unfamiliar belief. In this sense, the free exercise and establishment clauses form a coherent whole, prohibiting government from determining which reli gious beliefs merit constitutional protection. As the Court noted in Larson v. Valente, the "constitu tional prohibition of denominational preferences is inextricably connected with the continuing vitality of the Free Exercise Clause." 456 U.S. at 245. Accord Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981) (belief need not be logical or consistent to merit First Amendment protection); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953) (fact that belief is unusual or held by few does not remove constitutional protection). Cf M. HowE, THE GARDEN AND THE WILDERNESS 1-33 (1965) (estab lishment clause serves to protect free exercise, and was motivated as much by desire of evangelical sects to avoid governmental corruption of religion as by skeptical Jeffersonian separationists). In considering the right of a municipality to control the use of public streets for the expression of religious views, we start with [the premise that] "Wherever the title of streets and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for the use of the public, and, time out of mind, have been used for purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and discussing public questions." (quoting Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. at 515). Clearly, then, First Amendment use of a public place "from time out of mind" may limit the right of government to exclude would-be exercisers of this right.
89. See supra notes 87 and 38. 90. The public forum doctrine could serve as a useful limitation on protection of sacred sites in addition to the injury-in-fact and sincerity requirements. See infr a text accompanying notes 98-99. As Ch ief Justice Burger noted in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 226-27, where a religious way of life that existed long before state activity or regulation is threatened by the government, the free exercise clause protects the religious interest against all but the most compelling of state needs. A similar argument could be made for the protection of sacred sites that existed before the issue of title to the land was ever considered. The free exercise clause provides constitutional relief from development, the argument runs, where native worship predates European settlement or extinguishment of aboriginal title. Even where Indian religious practices at sacred sites began after installation on reservations, the government should be estopped from denying the application of the free exercise clause where the tribal presence is the result of unwilling migration or treaty compliance. This "traditional worship" application of the public forum doctrine would exclude new religions from the ambit of site-specific co nstitutional protection. For example, under this theory, a person who claimed that the Lincoln Memorial was an incarnate God would not be entitled to preserve the Memorial from alteration or destruction. The public forum analogy protects only those beliefs and practices that have existed "from time out of mind." 94. Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority in the famous "snail darter" case, TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 178 (1978) , quoted from the Act's legislative history:
From the most narrow point of view, it is in the best interests of mankind to minimize the losses of genetic variations .... They are keys to puzzles we cannot solve, and may provide answers to questions we have not yet learned to ask . . Sheer self-interest impels us to be cautious. 95. The ESA represents a commitment to the belief that the nation as a whole will profit by preserving the variety of nature whenever possible, even at substantial cost and inconvenience to gov ernment. Above all, caution is to be observed when taking irreversible steps toward destruction of a unique form of life.
The value of a life form is thus not measured economically or politically under the ESA. Rather, all forms of life are considered equal, and their status as endangered is left up to scientists as those most qualified to evaluate the danger. Section 1533(b) of the Act requires the Secretary of the Interior to determine whether a species is endangered or threatened "on the basis of the best scientific and com mercial data available," as well as in consultation with local residents and officials. See Rosenberg, Federal Protection of Unique Environmental Interests: Endangered and Threatened Species, 58 N. C.L. REV. 49 1, 526 (1981) : "The federal policy has been based upon specific determinations that a particular species is endangered, not political decisions that the specific plant or animal is worthy of federal protection. In this way federal law regards all species as being equal in their value to society." Similarly, the Israeli Ho ly Places Law consigns the definition and description of a sacred site to the adherents of the religion involved. See supra notes 16-17.
The constitutional prohibition against government-sanctioned orthodoxy embodied in the First Amendment also mandates equal treatment of religious interests, whether or not espoused by many or powerful believers. The First Amendment's safeguard of diversity, the Supreme Court has held, for bids qualitative analysis of religious belief. See supra notes 84 & 86. Central to the meaning of the free exercise clause is the protection of values and activities, the worth of which may always remain unknown.
Avoidance of the incalculable harm to religion that is the inevitable result of government-decreed orthodoxy was certainly one factor involved in the enactment of both the establishment and free exercise clauses.97 The free dom to believe and worship embodied in the First Amendment is rendered meaningless if government destroys the object of belief.
B.
The Future of Indian Religious Freedom
The proper focus for adjudication of Indian free exercise claims to pro tect sacred sites is the religious context of the threatened harm. Since na tive belief is intricately tied to physical sites, the focus of constitutional 96. The legislative history of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act demonstrates a federal commitment to fostering the free exercise of Indian religion. As Senator Abourezk said when urging passage of the Act: "America does not need to violate the religions of her native peoples. There is room for and great value in cultural and religious diversity. We would all be poorer if these American Indian religions disappeared from the face of the Earth." 123 CoNG. REC. 39,300-01 (Dec. 15, 1977) ; see also J. BROWN, supra note 3, at 29 (spiritual legacy of Indian religions of priceless value to United States).
The legislative history of the ESA reveals that the motivation for its enactment parallels the con gressional concerns expressed by passage of the AIRF A. The federal government is concerned that the varieties of both genetic and religious life that enrich our nation may be irrevocably destroyed by inadvertent or hasty action. "Consideration of [the] need to protect endangered species goes beyond the aesthetic. In hearings before the Subcommittee on the Environment it was shown that many of these animals perform vital biological services to maintain a 'balance of nature' within their environments. Also revealed was the need for biological diversity for scientific purposes." S. REP. No. 307, 93rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1973) , reprinted in 1973 U.S. CoDE CoNG. & AD. NEWS 2989-90. Other commen tators have noted the similarity of language and purpose between the AIRF A and legislation enacted to protect natural resources. Note, AIRFA , supra note 27, at 431 n. 16 (AIR FA preamble expresses ideas common to environmental and ecological movements).
97. See M. HowE, supra note 86, at 9 ("[I]f the First Amendment codified a figure of speech it embraced the believing affirmations of Roger Williams and his heirs no less firmly than it did the questioning doubts of Thomas Jefferson and the Enlightenment."). Cf Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 614 (1971) (purpose of religion clauses is "to prevent, as far as possible, the intrusion of either [religion or government] into the precincts of the other").
analysis should shift from the examination of written tradition and acts of conscience to an analysis of the site-specific context in which such claims are brought.
This inquiry would not fundamentally alter the balancing process of constitutional adjudication, but would shift the analysis of the religious interest away from doctrinally narrow traditional free exercise principles toward an approach designed to give appropriate consideration to unique or unusual religious beliefs. This process would assess the degree of harm threatened to a traditional Indian religion by proposed development of a sacred site in the context of the tribal religion itself. When an adherent of the religion met the threshold requirement of establishing an infringement of the vitality or existence of a tribal deity or practice, the burden would shift to the government to show the development was justified by a com pelling state need,98 and that it was planned in the least restrictive form possible. 99 The constitutional balancing of interests would weigh the po tential benefits to government gained from the logging or mining or con struction of a recreational resort against the degree of harm threatened to Indian site-specific deities and practices as a result of the development.
Once the inquiry into the nature of the religious interests at stake in Native American suits has been adjusted to reflect the close bond of the spiritual to the physical in Indian theology, classic jurisdictional notions of standing100 and sincerity 101 would limit claims to those in which the plaintiff has a genuine religious interest at stake.
98.
A law or project that infringes First Amendment freedoms must be justified by a compelling state interest. See supra note 43, see also Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1980) (regulation prohibiting religious groups from using college facilities did not rest on compelling state need); Schnei der v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (town's policy of requiring police permit for door-to door solicitation infringed of First Amendment rights of Jehovah's Witnesses; town interest in preventing fraud and trespass was not compelling) .
99. A governmental action must also be narrowly drawn to further the compelling state need. See supra note 44, see also Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U. S. 105, 116-17 (1943) (state regulation of public activity must be carefully worded to avoid impermissible overbreadth that would violate First Amendment rights); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (state must use less drastic means of curbing fraud than requiring state certification of religious cause for door-to-door solicitations).
The Supreme Court has held that "freedom of religion [is] in a preferred position." Murdock, 319 U.S. at 115. " [O] nly those [state] interests of the highest order" can overcome an infringement of religion. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972) . The greater the intrusion into religious freedom, therefore, the more compelling must be the interest posited by government as overriding the religious interest. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407 (1963) (administrative cost-reduction and efficiency do not justify abridging, even indirectly, religious freedom of Seventh Day Adventist by denying her unemployment benefits for refusing to work on her Sabbath).
100. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United For Separation of Church and State, 454 U.S. 464 (1982) (plaintiffs in article III courts must show "injury in fact" to have standing to sue). Under this standard, an Indian plaintiff would have to show that he or she would in fact be injured by the destruction or impairment of a sacred site. In this sense, the religion would suffer injury through its members, who would have standing to raise the constitutional issue.
101. The test for sincerity should focus on the existence of belief, rather than on intensity of belief. The legal system is designed to elicit truth, and triers of fact are assumed to be competent to determine whether a litigant or witness is sincere. As the California Supreme Court noted in People v. Indeed, a conclusion that constitutional protection of site-specific Indian deities violates the establishment clause would result in actual governmen tal destruction of religion through development. To hold that the estab lishment clause precludes challenges to termination of religious life forms Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 726, 394 P.2d 813, 821, 40 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77 (1964) : "We do not doubt the capacity of judge and jury to distinguish between those who would feign faith in an esoteric religion and those who would honestly follow it."
I 02. The establishment clause has often been invoked as a defense to free exercise claims, a reflec tion of the expansion of the definition of religion and the growth of governmental activity in all walks of life. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CoNSTITUTIONAL LAw § 14-1, at 812 (1978) (religion clauses, originally complementary, have come into conflict through growth of government and expan sion of our understanding of nature of religion). While the two clauses are in tension in some respects, the Supreme Court has made it clear that anti-establishment principles may not serve as the means of
CoNCLUSION
Traditional free exercise doctrine has tended to produce inconsistent re sults, because of its focus on "acts of conscience" rather than on faith, and because of its centrality requirement. To give meaning to the protection of religion mandated by the First Amendment, the judicial system must ana lyze free exercise claims in their religious context.
The conceptual flaws of traditional free exercise analysis are especially destructive when applied to Native American claims to protect sacred sites on public lands. Despite the constitutional commitment to religious diver sity, courts have failed to protect Indian religions. Because native free ex ercise claims are unique in their emphasis on specific sites as the loci of spirits and spirtuality, courts must approach the analysis of governmental development of sacred sites with a test that takes these considerations into account. Use of analogies to statutory and judicial limitations on the alien ability of public land, such as the public forum doctrine and the ESA, would provide a contextual framework that properly reflects the religious concerns of Native Americans.
--Sarah B. Gordon I 08. L. TRIBE, supra note 102, § 14-6, at 831. The Supreme Court has held that the establish ment clause may not be used as a justification for espousing a policy of "callous indifference " to the interests of religious individuals and organizations. Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 ( 1952) (upholding released-time program for public school students to attend religious instruction classes at parochial schools).
